Hear all
about it! Managed Print Services (MPS) headlines are
everywhere. If you are not anxious about MPS opportunities and
threats by now, you need to drink another coffee to get your
heart-rate percolating.
Yes, MPS is the talk of the industry – the hot topic at every
trade show and the feature in at least every other trade
magazine article. The industry’s most prestigious
manufacturers and software companies - almost like medieval
alchemists - are promoting MPS packages that do everything
short of turning base metals into gold and transforming water
into wine. Just listen to that buzz! You offer managed printer
fleet solutions, remote diagnostics and just-in-time
fulfillment of consumables through specialized whoop-de-do
software at the push of a button.
MPS sounds like a real gold rush opportunity. The purpose of
this article is to warn the dealer owners – those guys and
gals who are footing the investment in MPS initiatives – that
they should exercise caution and professional skepticism.
History has taught us the hard lessons - that although
billions of dollars of gold were harvested from “them there
hills”, few 49ers got rich and many endured hardships and
perished in the pursuit. The folks who got rich were the
individuals who set up businesses to support all of the
prospectors. Sound familiar?
The essence of MPS is to offer customers lower costs in return
for additional dealer services and support. Make no mistake,
while an opportunity, this offering represents a major
fundamental threat to the industry.
The very essence of MPS - its key marketing themes - is that
customers will receive additional dealer services and support
at a lower cost. This MPS attribute alone should get an
owner’s heart pumping more rapidly. MPS definitely represents
a real opportunity for some players. But, for many dealers,
MPS represents a real threat to both the top and bottom lines
of future financial performance. In a nutshell at a
high-level, MPS represents:
1. An
outstanding opportunity for strong copier dealers, especially
those who have been unconscionably ignoring the printer
opportunity for years.
2. A key
opportunity for strong printer dealers to take additional
share – both printer and copier business - from the copier
guys.
3. A
substantial windfall for MPS consultants, software vendors and
manufacturers who have been rolling out solution after
solution for dealers.
4. A
significant threat for many printer and copier dealers
especially those which do not have the wherewithal to invest
and compete at MPS. Such dealers should prepare for their
mid-market and larger customers in their base to be under
continued assault for years to come by aggressive dealers
seeking to control the network and all of the output devices
hanging on the network.
YES, MPS will ultimately prove very profitable for many MPS
participants but many of the achievers will not be dealers. A
large segment of the achievers will include the manufacturers,
the software vendors, the industry consultants, and most
important to the dealer – the dealer’s customers. Ultimately
the strong copier and printer dealers will survive and even
thrive; particularly dealers with the capability to provide
customers with real business solutions. Of major concern
however is whether this relatively smaller population of
dealers will prosper at the expense of their less fortunate
counterparts. Lowering customer prices in return for
additional services and support will cause many industry
players a great deal of financial pain.
There is only so much net-new customer business available for
dealers to pursue.
Vendors and consultants seem very skilled at inventing and
marketing new methods to chase and attack the same basic
business opportunities. Often times, as is the case here with
MPS, new technologies facilitate new methods – the cycle is
inevitable and perpetual. With MPS being featured everywhere
and to every dealer and customer, one vital question is
whether there truly are new business opportunities available
or just more sophisticated technological ways to chase the
same old business – a business which may actually be declining
rather than growing as copy and print growth slows.
Dealer owners need to study and understand overall industry
trends alongside predominant MPS themes and implications
before jumping into MPS with two feet. Dealers, both
individually and collectively, need to be careful not to “eat
their own babies” at lower prices. While MPS buzz suggests
opportunity is unlimited, amidst all of the hype, dealer
owners need to read the tea leaves to interpret and determine
whether MPS represents more of an opportunity or threat for
them individually, especially for the long term.
One obvious potential threat to all dealers is that the
net-new business opportunity is limited and there is only so
much customer opportunity to go around for the dealer
community to target. Under this assumption, logic dictates
that the dealers which in fact prosper will be extracting
their pound of flesh from other dealer pockets, rather than
capitalizing on discovering new business within the customer.
MPS, despite all its hype, may primarily represent just a more
sophisticated repackaging of the same dealer services and
support for essentially the same customer opportunity. In
other words, just because MPS is hot within the industry, it
hardly means that there is a whole bunch of net-new customer
opportunities available for the overall dealer community.
Dealers participating in MPS ultimately may find themselves
chasing the same old customer opportunities with repackaged
services and support at a lower customer price. This is
extremely dangerous to everyone in the industry.
Dealers capitalizing on the MPS trend may prosper, but the
prosperity may be short-term and at the expense of other
dealers which suffer through a reshuffling of customer
opportunity. While MPS consultants, trainers, and vendors make
bunches of money, and customers save bunches of money, what
business is left on the table for the average industry dealer?
And, what will it cost to play this game and will any profits
be illusory?
As the old adage goes, there is no free lunch. Managing MPS
transactions properly and efficiently will require lots of
hard work along with investment in systems and capabilities in
order to competently bundle and manage additional machines,
software, services and supply offerings. Substantial
investments will be required to experience increasing revenue
and profitability. Frankly, dealers may be required to invest
more just to remain status quo and to protect their existing
base and market-share. Most increases, especially short-term,
will likely only be derived from the other dealer pockets. And
even those MPS dealers which ultimately succeed long-term will
endure short-term increases in costs and investments and
therefore lower short-term profitability.
Lessons learned during conversion of analog to
digital devices
Dealer owners evaluating the MPS opportunity should be wary of
any fuzzy math being used by third parties. MPS consultants
are touting MPS tools and techniques that will enable dealers
to be proficient, but owners should check their math. Offering
customers lower prices for additional services and support
requires application of a new math, or at lease new operating
models and systems which enable dealers to become far more
efficient to lower transaction costs to yield comparable
profitability.
We should have learned such fuzzy math lessons from the
mid-to-late 1990’s and early 2000’s when analog machines
converted rapidly to digital. A short history lesson is worth
reminiscing about because it may prove analogous to the MPS
revolution.
The analog to digital revolution occurred relatively rapidly
and was very painful for many dealers; even mega dealers who
would eventually rule the roost. Many dealers experienced more
economic distress than customer opportunity. Besides being
stuck with large and expensive amounts of old analog
inventory, many dealers experienced eroding top-line revenue
and bottom-line profits when digital prices-per-copy were
offered to customers at severe discounts. In many cases, the
substantial increases forecasted for digital copy-volume
either never materialized or was insufficient to offset
declining revenue associated with lower customer pricing.
Likewise, expected dealer efficiencies and lower
costs-per-copy were insufficient to prevent eroding profit
margins. The net result was that many dealers experienced
substantial declines in both revenue and profitability. Many
still have not recovered from the good old days of high
prices-per-copy and resultant after-market profitability.
Some folks just did not comprehend the fuzzy math. I vividly
recall the turmoil being experienced by IKON during this
analog to digital revolution. The dynamics and issues
associated with the conversion was a hot topic of conversation
at a critical meeting of the top twenty or so IKON executives
in Valley Forge. This meeting clearly revealed the serious
trouble and bumpy road ahead yet management ignored all these
tell-tale signs.
Three of the top IKON operating executives were all touting
how new digital machines were enabling service technicians to
become so much more efficient than when they were servicing
analog machines. They told the audience that the introduction
and placements of the more reliable digital devices was
enabling service technicians to service substantially more
copies. Most of this was true but the implications were not
understood. The impact of digital devices were only being
advertized to the audience as the most promising industry
developments which would bode well for everyone in future –
that it would lead to superior financial performance and
shareholder value.
Unfortunately, the audience drank too much of this punch.
Basic mathematics and fundamental alarming facts were being
ignored. In fact, IKON’s revenue-per-copy from digital
offerings, like for most other competitors, was dropping
precipitously. This declining revenue-per-copy caused rapid
revenue declines which in turn caused dramatic erosion of
bottom-line profitability. The pain was all self-inflicted.
Despite the ability to service an increasing number of digital
copies, total revenue-per-service-tech was dropping while
technician compensation, digital training and other service
costs were escalating. The ability to service substantially
more digital copies per month was not nearly enough to offset
lower prices-per-copy being offered to the customer.
Anticipated increases in copy volume within customer accounts
never materialized at forecasted levels.
The math exercise and its implications could not have been
more straight-forward, yet key decision-makers ignored the
threat because they were relying on the wrong fundamental
metrics.
| |
Analog
|
Digital |
Change |
|
Revenue
per tech |
|
|
|
|
Copies
serviced per month
|
750,000 |
1,200,000
|
|
|
Customer
price per copy |
$0.012
|
$0.0065
|
|
|
Revenue
per tech per month |
$9,000 |
$7,800
|
|
|
Revenue
per tech per year declined |
$108,000 |
$93,600 |
-$14,400 |
| |
|
|
|
|
Cost
per tech |
|
|
|
|
Annual
comp per tech |
$45,000
|
$50,000 |
|
|
Digital
training |
$2,000
|
|
|
|
Annual
cost per tech increased |
$45,000 |
$52,000 |
$7,000
|
| |
|
|
|
|
Profitability per tech declined |
$63,000
|
$41,600
|
-$21,400 |
| |
|
|
|
|
# of techs |
18,000
|
15,000
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
Annual
service profitability declined |
$1,134,000,000 |
$624,000,000 |
-$510,000,000 |
| |
Rather than
comparing and managing the trend of revenue and cost
profitability-per-tech, management was preoccupied and
insisted to the audience that copies-per-tech was the key
metric in managing the service organization. Relying on the
wrong metric resulted in faulty conclusions followed by poor
decision-making. The underlying industry dynamics had changed
but were ignored. The math exercise is illustrated in the
example below.
As the analysis illustrates, lower customer prices resulted in
rapidly declining revenue-per-tech. This was exacerbated by
increasing tech comp and other costs associated with the
digital developments. As revenue and cost moved in the
opposite and wrong directions, naturally,
profitability-per-tech declined. Whether your dealer employed
only handful service techs or thousands like IKON, these
industry dynamics had dramatic negative effects on results.
For an organization like IKON that employed thousands of
techs, the chart illustrates the dramatic annual impact on
profitability – over a half billion dollar decline in annual
profits. You can imagine how such declines in profitability
are perceived for a publicly traded NYSE company by Wall
Street. The impact on shareholder value and the company’s
stock price was severe. And, just as severe was the resultant
loss in credibility. Many large, medium and small dealers
across the industry experienced similar pain from earnings and
value erosion.
Another fundamental mathematical calculation which was
overlooked in this equation during the analog to digital
revolution was the effect of the reduction in the number of
service techs employed by IKON. While IKON was persuading the
audience that reducing their headcount by several thousand
techs was testimony of capability and efficiency, management
simply ignored a RIF (Reduction in Force) of thousands of
techs who previously averaged over $100,000 in revenue and
about $60,000 or so in profitability was hardly an encouraging
development. All those dollars were gone.
To overlook the amount of revenue and profit generated by
these thousands of techs during the analog era was perilous in
the management decision-making process. And to think that it
was relatively simple industry dynamics analogous to MPS that
resulted in such large amounts of revenue and profit
evaporating. Customer prices-per-copy were lowered across the
board. Net-new opportunities were limited. Expected increases
in copy-volume and revenue from other follow-on services were
not realized. Increases in dealer efficiencies were
insufficient to offset declining margins for the revenue
decline, which occurred so dramatically that dealers did not
have time to right-size overhead.
Owner action plan: Do your homework and focus on the details
and fundamentals when assessing the MPS opportunity
Hopefully the industry’s MPS experience will be far different
than the digital revolution. MPS hype however does ring of
déjà vu.
Owners seeking to pursue a lower risk strategy and not wishing
to dabble too deep into MPS should focus on tying up and
penetrating their own customer base as much as possible to
prevent competitive takeaways. Protecting your base strategies
however could become exceedingly more difficult when
competitors are willing to drop prices so low that customers
cannot resist rolling over for this marketing pitch of lower
costs, better services and more support.
Copier dealers should focus extensively on the printer supply
and consumable sales opportunities within their own customer
base. Much of this printer opportunity has been left on the
table for years. Tying up such opportunities will decrease the
risk of competitive takeaways.
Every copier and printer dealer of any substantial size should
establish a web-store for selling consumables and low-end
devices. One only needs to study Staples’ history for a lesson
in how successful web-store sales can be. After its initial
launch, in about five short years, Staples went from zero
internet sales to about 40% of its revenue being generated
from its internet store with no end in sight.
For those dealers jumping onto the MPS bandwagon with two
feet, based on our analog to digital revolution history
lesson, owners should make sure to take at least the following
steps:
1. Track MPS revenue, cost and profitability overall as well
as at a transaction level. If your revenue per-print and copy
decline, your costs-per-print and copy must decline at least
at the same pace.
2. Enhance customer solutions offerings to ensure you are
generating some net new business from customers and not just
lowering the price. While always easier to say than to
accomplish, if you do not offer real business solutions, you
are increasing your risk of losing the account to a dealer
which surely will offer such solutions. Focusing on
high-volume vertical markets will facilitate solution sales
success, because once you formulate an effective solution, you
can leverage it across similar customers.
3. Measure and manage the trend of revenue-per-service tech
and match against cost-per-tech.
4. Measure and manage the trend of other service efficiency
metrics. Make sure your organization becomes as efficient and
reliable as the machines you are selling and servicing.
5. Consumables, Consumables, Consumables – Refine your
consumable sales strategy to make sure your existing customers
are hooked before embarking on pursuing more expensive net-new
business. After-market margins are still very attractive and
lots of printer cartridge business is being left on the table
within your existing customer base.
In summary, hopefully, MPS will provide all dealers with more
opportunity than pain. Hopefully there will be enough and
plenty of net-new business to go around for all dealers.
Hopefully copy and print-volume will increase at a pace to
offset reduced customer prices-per-page and copy. Hopefully
customers will not really request lower prices for more
services and support. Hopefully your competitors will have the
courage to hold their prices and profit margins at acceptable
levels.
However, owners should not hold their breath and just hope.
You need to strategize about how you will operate going
forward. You need to better utilize both your sales and
service organization to capture the business available out
there.
Fundamentally, printers and copiers are becoming more
reliable. Consequently, customers not only expect lower
prices, but they are demanding lower prices for more services.
In these tough times, customers may tend to be less loyal. Of
course, there generally are dealers willing to accommodate
even aggressive customer demands. But for most dealer owners,
the fundamental industry trend of more reliable units at lower
service prices is not all positive news. Since we cannot just
go back to the good old days when copiers did two basic
things, making copies and breaking down, it’s critical for
dealer owners’ to carefully evaluate their current strategies
and action plans to protect their customer base and profit
margins.
Mike Dudek, an attorney and CPA, is the founder & owner of
Zygoquest which provides customized merger & acquisition
services and valuation & due diligence services to buyers &
sellers of companies. Zygoquest is the #1 M&A authority in
the office products industry. Mike Dudek & Rich Wisniewski are
authors of over 400 consummated M&A transactions during their
careers. Prior to founding Zygoquest, Mike Dudek was VP of
Acquisitions for IKON Office Solutions, a $5.5 billion NYSE
company acquired by Ricoh Corporation. Contact Mike Dudek at
(610) 873-6555 or at mdudek@zygoquest.com. For more info,
visit www.zygoquest.com.